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Article 9

Naïve Textualism in Patent Law

*

Jonathan R. Siegel†
INTRODUCTION
This symposium asks, “How much work does language
do?” The answer these days is “too much.” Courts are letting
statutory language do the work that used to be done by judges’
paying sensitive attention to context, history, policy, and
background understandings.1 Or at least, they are apparently
doing so—the even less appealing possibility is that courts are
using statutory language as a cover for decisions reached on
other grounds.2
I have long argued that part of the judicial function in
statutory interpretation is to apply “background principles” of
law, or “field-specific canons of construction.”3 Courts, in
construing statutes, should—and do—discern the background
principles of the area of law of which a statute is a part and
interpret statutory text in light of them. Background principles
of law frequently influence statutory interpretation, and in
appropriate cases, the force of field-specific canons of
construction may be so great as to cause courts to depart from
apparently clear statutory text.4
*

© 2011 Jonathan R. Siegel. All rights reserved.
Professor of Law, Kahan Research Professor, George Washington
University Law School; A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law School. The author is
currently on leave from teaching while serving as the Director of Research and Policy
of the Administrative Conference of the United States. This essay is written in the
author’s academic capacity and is not endorsed by the United States or any agency
thereof. The author wishes to thank the participants in the Brooklyn Law School
symposium at which this paper was presented for their helpful comments.
1
See infra Part II.B.
2
See infra Part II.C.
3
Jonathan R. Siegel, Guardians of the Background Principles, 2009 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 123, 123-29; Jonathan R. Siegel, What Statutory Drafting Errors Teach Us
About Statutory Interpretation, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 309, 348 (2001); Jonathan R.
Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023,
1033, 1043-44, 1054 (1998) [hereinafter Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism].
4
See, e.g., Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism, supra note 3, at 1045-48.
Such cases are unusual, but they are sufficiently numerous to demonstrate that reliance
on background principles is a part of the judicial process of statutory construction.
†
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Textualist interpreters, however, are pushing more and
more in the direction of insistently following statutory text.
Textualists are becoming increasingly radical, as they
gradually realize that the accommodations they previously
allowed in order to reach sensible results are inconsistent with
fundamental textualist premises.5 This trend has resulted in
the creation of a “naïve textualism.” This mode of
interpretation is not sharply differentiated from textualism per
se, but is distinguished by its naïve attitude that statutes can
be best understood by simply looking up their words in a
dictionary, applying a few canons of statutory construction, and
eschewing other considerations.
The Supreme Court recently provided an excellent
example of its radical shift in the direction of naïve textualism
in the field of patent law. For decades—indeed, for centuries—
patent law was a paradigm of richly contextualized judicial
interpretation. Courts understood the sparse text of patent
statutes in light of history, policy, and background
understandings of the field of patent law.6 In the recent case of
Bilski v. Kappos,7 however, the Supreme Court looked to little
more than the dictionary in deciding fundamentally important
questions under the patent statute. Bilski shows the dangers of
language doing too much work.
This essay first outlines the Court’s shift from a richly
contextual approach to a naïvely textualist approach to
statutory interpretation in patent law,8 and then discusses why
courts should avoid naïve textualism.9
I.

INTERPRETING THE PATENT ACT, THEN AND NOW

A.

Traditional Methods of Interpreting the Patent Act

For a statute that governs such an important and
tremendously varied array of human behavior, the Patent Act
is remarkably compact. Three short sections set out the
requirements that a patentable invention be new, useful, and
nonobvious, and comprise a patentable subject matter.10 But life
5

Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 117, 120-22 (2009).
6
See infra Part I.A.
7
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
8
See infra Part I.
9
See infra Part II.
10
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (2006).
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under the patent statute is not as simple as its brief text might
suggest: “the statute cannot be read in isolation from the array
of judicial precedent that has interpreted nearly each of its
words.”11 In making the terse language of the patent statute
workable in practice, the courts have glossed, strained, and
sometimes departed from the statutory text, and they have not
been embarrassed to acknowledge their policy reasons for doing
so. To fully document the judicial role in drawing patent law
principles out of sparse statutory text would require far more
space than is available in a symposium contribution, but a few
examples will give the flavor of traditional judicial methods of
interpreting the Patent Act.
1. Novelty
Section 102 of the Patent Act, which embodies the
statutory requirement that a patented invention be “new,” has
been the subject of much judicial development. For example,
the statute provides that an invention cannot be patented if,
prior to the applicant’s invention of it, the invention was
“known . . . by others in this country.”12 Notwithstanding the
seemingly straightforward text of the statute, however, the
courts have held that the word “known” means “publicly
known.” A patent, therefore, is not barred by prior knowledge
of the invention that was not available to the public.13 The
courts have justified this somewhat strained reading on the
policy ground that an inventor should not lose patent rights
because of knowledge that a prior inventor kept “in his closet.”14
This textual strain becomes more readily apparent
when one contrasts this reading of “known” with the reading
that courts give to the rule that a patent cannot be granted if
the claimed invention was in “public use” more than a year
prior to the date of the patent application.15 The cases that
address this issue hold that a use is a “public use,” within the
meaning of the statute, even if it is hidden from public view
and gives the public no information about the invention—as
11

ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE
LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS, AND TRADEMARKS 323 (2003).
12
35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
13
E.g., Carella v. Starlight Archery, 804 F.2d 135, 139 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re
Borst, 345 F.2d 851, 854 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (referring to this rule as a “well-established
principle”).
14
Heath v. Hildreth, 11 F. Cas. 1003, 1005 (C.C.D.C. 1841).
15
35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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might occur, for example, if the invention were a mechanism
hidden in the workings of a watch.16 Thus, the statutory
prohibition that includes the word “public” requires less public
knowledge than the statutory text that does not—certainly a
surprising result from a textualist perspective.17
The surprise is still greater when one learns that even
the most open, public use of an invention does not count as a
“public use” if the purpose of the use is to test the invention,
even though the statutory text makes no reference to the
purpose of a use.18 Again, the courts have not hesitated to justify
this atextual reading on policy grounds, based on the rationale
that “it is the interest of the public, as well as [of the inventor],
that the invention should be perfect and properly tested.”19 Many
similar examples of courts adopting atextual interpretations of
the Patent Act’s novelty requirement could be cited.20
2. Nonobviousness
Section 103 of the Patent Act provides that, even if an
invention survives the novelty requirement of section 102, a
patent cannot be obtained if the invention “would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
16

Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881).
See id. at 338-39 (Miller, J., dissenting) (complaining that “the word public
is . . . an important member of the sentence” and that the Court’s reading “eliminate[s]
from the statute the word public”).
18
Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1877) (holding
that installing experimental pavement on a public toll road for six years was not a “public
use”).
19
Id. at 137.
20
Indeed, the first U.S. patent act barred a patent if the invention was
“known or used before the application” for a patent. Patent Act, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
Read naïvely, this language would bar all patents, because every inventor necessarily
knows his or her claimed invention before applying for a patent for it. The Supreme
Court saved the statute by interpreting it as applying only to knowledge or use by
others besides the inventor, as Section 102(a) now provides. E.g., Shaw v. Cooper, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 292, 319 (1833).
Another strikingly atextual reading relates to manufacturing process
inventions. If a process is secretly used to produce a product that is openly sold, such
use is a “public use” of the process only if it is by the patentee himself, and not if it is
by others, even though the statutory text makes no reference to who is using the
invention. Compare Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153
F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946) (holding such use to be public if by the patentee himself), with
W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding such use
not to be public if by another). In each case, the court justified its interpretation on
policy grounds. See W.L. Gore, 721 F.2d at 1550 (holding that the law prefers a later
inventor who files a patent application over an earlier one who keeps the process
secret); Metallizing Eng’g, 153 F.2d at 520 (holding that the patent applicant should
not be permitted to “extend . . . his monopoly”).
17
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ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains.”21 This requirement was born as an extratextual
statutory gloss; the Supreme Court read it into the word
“invention” in the Patent Act (if, indeed, the Court was
concerning itself with statutory language at all) long before the
modern section 103 even existed.22 Today, the requirement is
the subject of a strikingly atextual rule: although the text
clearly turns on whether the invention would have been
obvious “at the time the invention was made,” the lower courts
have held that it bars a patent for an invention that would
have been obvious in light of material published more than a
year before the filing of the patent application, even if
publication took place after the invention was made.23 Again,
this interpretation is justified on policy grounds.24
3. Subject Matter
Perhaps nowhere has the judiciary played a larger role
in the development of patent law than with regard to
patentable subject matter—the fundamental question of what
kinds of things are patentable. Section 101 of the Patent Act
provides: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.”25 Innumerable cases have attempted to explain this
requirement, particularly with regard to “process” inventions.
Although the statutory term “process” seems very broad
(especially since it is further statutorily defined to mean
“process, art, or method”),26 the courts have long imposed
restrictions based on widely shared understandings of what
kinds of things are patentable. Most fundamentally, the
Supreme Court has held that “laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable.27 This rule
is tied less to statutory text than to the principle that such
21

35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850). It is unclear
from the Court’s opinion whether the Court was interpreting a specific word in the
Patent Act or simply relying on general principles.
23
In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980, 987-90 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
24
See id.
25
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
26
Id. § 100(b).
27
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
22
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things cannot be patented because they are “the basic tools of
scientific and technological work.”28 While the boundaries of the
category of “abstract idea” are not especially clear, the
Supreme Court has held, for example, that algorithmic
processes that do no more than manipulate numbers are not
patentable, even though they would fall within the dictionary
definition of the term “process.”29
Particular controversy has surrounded the patentability
of processes that may be characterized as “business methods.”
Although the dictionary definition of the term “process” (and its
statutory predecessor, “art”) would encompass a process for
doing business, the patent community long acted on the basis
of a widely shared “understanding . . . about what patents were
meant to protect” under which an application for a patent on a
business method “would have been seen as absurd.”30 Based on
this understanding, courts long denied patents for business
methods, and treatise writers agreed that business methods, as
generally understood, were outside the patent system.31
Thus, for well over a century, the courts, including the
Supreme Court, imbued the text of the patent statute with
meaning based on widely shared, background understandings
of how the patent system is supposed to work.32 Courts deployed
a substantial amount of policy reasoning in arriving at their
decisions. They accepted an important role in the development
of patent law. Some of the resulting decisions heavily glossed
the statutory text, and some can only be described as having
departed from the statutory text.

28

Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
Id. at 67-72.
30
Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 577, 585 (1999); see also Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the
Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and
the Missed Opportunity to Ground Patent Law Interpretation and Return Patent Law to
Its Technology Mooring, STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at *5-9)
(available on SSRN); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C.
L. REV. 1139, 1145-47 (1999). (Professor Menell’s article, which concerns a topic similar
to that of this essay, was posted on SSRN in December 2010, after this essay was
presented at the Brooklyn Law School symposium in November 2010.)
31
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3246 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32
Menell, supra note 30, at *20-21.
29
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Business Method Patents and Naïve Textualism

Notwithstanding the long tradition of rich judicial
involvement in patent law, the Supreme Court recently applied
quite different interpretive methods with respect to the patent
statute, and particularly with regard to the question of
whether business methods are patentable subject matter. The
issue became prominent after 1998, when the Federal Circuit,
departing from tradition, declared that there was no “business
method” exception to patentability.33 The Federal Circuit’s
ruling led to a decade of uncertainty, during which inventors
claimed, somewhat absurdly, to have invented everything from
arbitration34 to hedging.35
Bilski v. Kappos arose when an inventor sought a patent
on a method of hedging against certain business risks.36 When
the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court, speaking
through Justice Kennedy, produced an opinion notably different
from those described in the previous section. Gone were the
appeals to policy and background understandings of the patent
system. In their place was brisk, textualist reasoning.
Patent law, the Court declared, is subject to the usual rule
that, “[u]nless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as
taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”37 In place
of policy analysis, the Court deployed “dictionary definitions” and
“common usage.”38 The Court recognized that the long-standing
exception for “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas”39 deviates from the dictionary definitions of words in the
Patent Act. But the Court denied that “the existence of these wellestablished exceptions gives the Judiciary carte blanche to impose
other limitations that are inconsistent with the text and the
statute’s purpose and design.”40
With specific regard to the question of whether the term
“process” can encompass business methods, the Court’s
33

State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
34
In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
35
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223.
36
See id. at 3223-24.
37
Id. at 3226 (alteration in original) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 182 (1981) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979))) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
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analysis was starkly textual.41 Looking to a 1954 dictionary, the
Court quoted the definition of “method” (part of the statutory
definition of “process”), and observed that this definition—“[a]n
orderly procedure or process . . . regular way or manner of
doing anything”42—encompasses methods of doing business.
The Court set aside the tradition of reading the language of the
Patent Act in light of history and background understandings;
it simply relied on the dictionary.
The Court buttressed its dictionary analysis with just
one other observation—an appeal to the canonical “rule against
redundancy.” The Court observed that section 273 of the Patent
Act provides a special, limited defense to claims based on
business method patents.43 Such a defense, the Court observed,
would be superfluous if there were no such thing as business
method patents in the first place.44 Although the Court
acknowledged that section 273 was a later addition to the
Patent Act (it was enacted only after the Federal Circuit’s 1998
decision approving business method patents),45 it said that the
rule against redundancy “cannot be overcome by judicial
speculation as to the subjective intent of various legislators in
enacting the subsequent provision.”46
And that was that. Justice Kennedy’s opinion went on to
invoke some policy reasoning; he explained that tests for
patentable subject matter had to respect the needs of the
information age.47 But these policy observations were not part
of the opinion of the Court. They were segregated into sections
of Justice Kennedy’s opinion that received four votes only;
Justice Scalia declined to join them.48 Thus, the opinion of the
Supreme Court was a textualist opinion that relied exclusively
on a dictionary definition and a canon of construction to decide
an extremely important question of patent law.

41

Menell, supra note 30, at *11-12 (noting that the Court “collapsed the rich
historical development of patentable subject matter doctrine into three amorphous,
static, and ill-defined exceptions”).
42
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228 (alteration in original) (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1548 (2d ed. 1954)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43
Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2006).
44
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228-29.
45
Id.; see also id. at 3250 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
46
Id. at 3229 (opinion of the Court).
47
Id. at 3227.
48
See id. at 3223 n.*.
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THE DANGERS OF NAÏVE TEXTUALISM

Bilski illustrates the dangers of naïve textualism. To
answer the question posed by this symposium, Bilski permits
statutory language to do too much work. The interpretive regime
of Bilski can be criticized in at least three ways. First, it seems
unfair to apply naïve textualism to a statute passed in a former
era, when courts applied quite different interpretive methods.
Second, even at its best, naïve textualism will result in too many
issues being decided by fortuitous language choices by a
legislature that did not foresee the decisions it was making. And
finally, at its worst, naïve textualism will serve as a disingenuous
cover for judicial choices made on extratextual grounds.
A.

The Bait and Switch of Bilski’s Naïve Textualism

In Bilski, the Supreme Court applied modern-day
textualism to a statute from a former era. Congress has not
comprehensively revised the Patent Act since 1952.49 At the
time Congress was writing the 1952 revisions, it had every
reason to expect that its handiwork would not be interpreted
purely textually.50 The courts had spent more than a century
sensitively applying (and interstitially making) patent law and
imbuing the statutory text with the spirit of widely shared
background understandings of the patent system.
Congress would likely have expected courts to continue
these practices. The statute’s authors would have expected that
they could trust the courts to exercise sound discretion in
implementing the patent system. It seems unfair for courts to
surprise Congress by changing the interpretive rules after a
statute is enacted. If an analysis of Bilski’s naïve textualism
suggests nothing else, it at least suggests that courts should
interpret a statute using the interpretive techniques that were
prevalent when the statute was adopted, lest Congress be
unfairly surprised.
It is, after all, standard dogma that courts should
consider a statute’s enactment date in determining the
meaning of individual words in it: courts look to the words’
“ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”51 That is why the
49

Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006)).
50
See supra Part I.A.
51
Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (emphasis added).
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Supreme Court consulted a 1954 dictionary to determine the
meaning of terms in the 1952 statute. But meaning does not
reside solely in the definitions given to individual words. It is
also a product of context and interpretive approach. If it is
sound practice not to read modern definitions of individual
words into a statute passed in a previous era, then it should be
sound not to read modern interpretive techniques into the
statute either.
Of course, it will not always be easy to say what the
interpretive regime was at a given point in history. The courts
make many pronouncements on interpretive methodology and
are not particularly consistent about it.52 But it seems clear
that interpretive methods prevailing in 1952 were not nearly as
textualist as the methods applied by the Supreme Court in
Bilski. Congress could reasonably claim unfair surprise at the
Court’s reading modern-day textualism back into history.
B.

Language Doing Too Much Work

Even setting aside the problem of applying a modern
interpretive approach to a statute passed in a different era, the
difficulty with naïve textualism is that it makes language do too
much work. The result is that fortuitous language choices—what
Larry Solan calls “linguistic accidents”53—made without
foreknowledge of issues that would later arise, end up controlling
questions of great moment. Extraordinary weight is being placed
on Congress’s choice of the words “process” and “method.”
The scope of patentable subject matter is vital to the
patent system. It is difficult to come up with a precise
definition of patentable subject matter, in part because the
very purpose of the patent system is to encourage the
development of new and unforeseen things.54 It is almost
inevitable, therefore, that the statutory language that defines
the scope of patentable subject matter will never perfectly
capture the universe of inventions that should be patentable.
The patent laws require sensitive construction by judges who
are knowledgeable in the full context of the patent system. If,

52

See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in
Statutory Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 385-89 (2005).
53
Lawrence M. Solan, Statutory Interpretation, Morality, and the Text, 76
BROOK. L. REV. 1033 (2011).
54
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1980).
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instead, the courts “make a fortress out of the dictionary,”55
they will doom legislatures to producing statutes with
unintended consequences that depart from widely shared
understandings of how the system is supposed to work.
To give the textualists their due, they are surely aware
of this point, and they have an answer to it. A textualist would
say that if a statute’s language is not used to answer whatever
questions arise under it, even questions that were
unanticipated at the time the language was written, the
alternative is for judges to answer the questions, and that
alternative gives judges too much power. Judges are not
supposed to make policy decisions in a democratic society; they
are supposed to implement the policy decisions laid down by
the legislature. By abandoning efforts to imbue statutes with
the spirit of policies and background understandings, courts
confine themselves to their proper role. If that means that
some questions get unanticipated answers, that is the price we
pay for preventing judges from exercising too much power.
The riposte to this argument, however, is that glossing
or even departing from statutory text need not mean that the
judges are implementing their own policies. In appropriate
cases glossing or departing from statutory text is precisely
what is needed to implement the legislature’s policies. The
trick, of course, is for judges to discern those unusual occasions
that warrant something other than straightforward application
of statutory text. Background principles play a critical role in
this process. When the result of simply running statutory
language through the dictionary is a startling departure from
widely shared background understandings of how the system is
supposed to work, it may be a clue to the court that indicates
that something other than a purely textual construction of the
statute is appropriate.56 Judges should certainly not depart
from statutory language at will, but neither should they make
statutory language do all the work.
C.

Language as a Cover for Judicial Decision Making

Moreover, the argument that judges ought to answer
questions based solely on statutory language, lest they exercise
too much policy-making power, is based on a highly

55
56

See Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.).
Siegel, supra note 52, at 373-74.
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questionable assumption—namely, that courts really can set
aside all other influences and decide questions based solely on
the statutory text. In fact, this seems unlikely. There is too
much indeterminacy in statutory text. Even courts that
purport to be abdicating any policy-making role and following
the rule laid down in the text may be making an interpretive
choice—as can be seen in Bilski.
In Bilski, the Court relied on a standard canon of
statutory construction, the rule against redundancy.57 The
Court noted (rightly enough) that the recently added section
273 of the Patent Act, which provides a limited defense to suits
based on business method patents, would be redundant if
business method patents could never exist. From a textualist
perspective, this is a strong argument.
The flaw in the argument, however, is that courts must
make a choice regarding whether to follow the rule against
redundancy. Sometimes courts set aside the rule on the ground
that a legislature occasionally writes redundant statutory text
as a precaution. Indeed, just two years before Bilski, in Ali v.
Federal Bureau of Prisons,58 the Supreme Court interpreted the
Federal Tort Claims Act in a way that arguably rendered some
words in the statutory text superfluous.59 The Court justified its
ruling by asserting that Congress might have inserted the
superfluous language “to remove any doubt.”60 Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Alito, all part of the
Bilski majority, joined this opinion.61
Two years later, in Bilski, the Court flatly asserted that
the rule against redundancy “cannot be overcome by judicial
speculation as to the subjective intent of legislators.”62
Obviously, this assertion is at best overstated and at worst
57

See supra Part I.B.
552 U.S. 214 (2008).
59
See id. at 237 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (complaining that the Court’s
reading rendered part of the text “mere surplusage” in violation of the rule against
redundancy).
60
Id. at 226 (majority opinion).
61
The Court similarly rejected application of the rule against redundancy on
the ground that the legislature might have inserted apparently superfluous language
to avoid risk of doubt in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 260 (1994),
although in that case the more textualist justices joined a separate concurrence. See
also Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (holding that a court
may reject words as “surplusage” if they are “inadvertently inserted or . . . repugnant
to the rest of the statute”) (quoting KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
525 (1980)).
62
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010).
58
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disingenuous. The Court has overcome the rule against
redundancy through judicial speculation about the subjective
intent of legislators. Indeed, the speculation in Ali was more
aggressive than would have been the necessary speculation in
Bilski. In Ali there was no particular evidence to suggest that
Congress had acted out of the caution that the Court attributed
to it, whereas in Bilski there was powerful evidence of the
motives behind the potentially redundant provision. Congress
inserted the statutory defense to actions based on business
method patents only after the Federal Circuit ruled that such
patents could be lawful. It seems quite plausible that Congress
was not trying to ratify the Federal Circuit’s decision, but to
limit any fallout that would ensue if that decision were
ultimately to stand.63
Something other than statutory language, therefore,
told the Supreme Court that it could overcome the rule against
redundancy in Ali, but not in Bilski.64 The judges made a
choice. Even within textualism, the rules of statutory
interpretation are not perfectly constraining. The canons of
construction are only guides.65 It is wrong to pretend that the
courts cannot overcome canons of statutory interpretation
when they can and do.
Justice Scalia has accused those who rely on legislative
history of using it merely as “an omnipresent makeweight for
decisions arrived at on other grounds.”66 Naïve textualism uses
text in the same way. It is bad enough to make language do all
the work. It is even worse to pretend that language has done
all the work, when other factors must have guided a court’s
understanding of that language.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court did not reach an inappropriate
result in Bilski—all nine justices agreed that the claimed

63

Of course, rather than insert a limited defense to business method patents,
Congress could have clarified that such patents should never be granted. But it might
have lacked the votes to settle the ultimate question of the validity of business method
patents, while having the votes for the limited defense.
64
See also Menell, supra note 30, at *14-15 (noting that the Court’s choice to
apply the canonical rule against redundancy in Bilski was in tension with the equally
canonical principle that repeals by implication are not favored).
65
E.g., Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 94.
66
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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invention was not patentable. But the Court displayed an
unfortunately naïve interpretive attitude. Setting aside the
centuries-old tradition of imbuing the text of the patent
statutes with a rich awareness of the history, policy, and
background understandings of the patent system, the Court
imagined, or at least pretended to imagine, that it could
interpret the Patent Act with no more tools than the dictionary
and the canons of construction.
Such naïve textualism, if generally applied, would make
the legislature’s job, and ultimately the task of governing, even
harder than it already is. The legislature cannot foresee
everything as it writes statutes. Judges must exercise
judgment in the process of statutory interpretation. Language
cannot do all the work.

